








The purpose of this paper is to clarify the theory of international economic sanctions
and to provide estimates of the short-run economic impact on South Africa of externally
imposed reductions of the imports and capital flows into that country. A macroeconomic
picture of South Africa’s "dependence" is drawn, and the economy’s vulnerability in the
short run is seen to be in its capacity to import, not in exports or capital flows. Trade and
capital sanctions most clearly damage South Afnca’s growth potential; the short-run
impact is harder to quantify. A static linear programming model of the South African
economy is constructed in an attempt at this quantification. This model estimates that
small sanctions would have small impact&mdash;i.e., if imports were reduced by less than one-
fourth, GDP would be cut by only about one half as large a percentage as imports. Larger
import reductions cause greater damage. If imports were to be cut in half, not only would
GDP be seriously reduced but massive unemployment and relocation of white labor
would occur.
I. INTRODUCTION
For some time, and with increasing frequency, sanctions have been
suggested as a means whereby the world community might force
changes in South Africa’s racial policies. But the resulting debate has
been hampered by a lack of clarity about how sanctions are supposed
to function and by a distinct shortage of refined empirical estimates of
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the potential impact of sanctions. The goal of this article is to alleviate
those deficiencies.
The word &dquo;sanctions&dquo; covers a wide variety of international actions
(see, e.g., Ferguson and Cotter, 1978). Here, we shall consider only one
set of such actions, where South Africa’s international trade of goods
and factors of production is impeded by agreement among its trading
partners. Thus, the initial impact of international sanctions-or boy-
cott, or embargo, the words are here considered synonyms-is upon
South Africa’s exports, imports, and net inflow of foreign capital; the
ultimate incidence is, as well, on the volume, structure, and growth of
South Africa output, income, and employment.
The theory of how sanctions &dquo;work&dquo; is developed in Section II. Not
surprisingly, the reviewed literature displays a variety of theories, not all
equally plausible and not all consistent with each other. A broad picture
of South African &dquo;dependence&dquo; is drawn in Section III, and a macro-
economic assessment made of what kinds of sanctions do and do not
have a potential to damage South African welfare. The source of the
potential damage is seen to be the deprivation of imports, and the im-
pact on growth is seen to be much more certain than the short-run effect.
A sectoral model is then constructed and exercised in Sections IV and V
in order to generate quantitative estimates of the potential short-run
impact of import reductions. The conclusions of the simulations, stated
more fully in section VI, are essentially that small import reductions
would have small impact but that significant import reductions would
cause nearly proportionate reductions in South Africa’s output plus
extensive relocation and unemployment of white labor.’
II. THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Although economists have written extensively about universal eco-
nomic sanctions, the precise mechanism whereby sanctions are sup-
posed to prove effective is not always clear, and several quite different
1. There are also four appendices which are too long to be included here They are
available from the Center for Research on Economic Development, Old Architecture
Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 48109, contained in Discussion Paper
No. 77. In Appendix A, the model of Sections IV and V is fully displayed. In Appendix B,
the derivation of the data and of the parameters of the model is described. In Appendix C,
the sectoral production functions of the model are developed in detail. And in Appendix
D, previous studies of sanctions that use input-output models are examined critically.
581
mechanisms can be discerned in the reviewed literature. The goal of
sanctions is clear and simple: to impose a reduction in economic wel-
fare on the target country and thereby reduce its willingness to persist in
antagonizing the world community. But even for this simple statement,
two complexities should be noted. First, the &dquo;thereby&dquo; is critical, al-
though there is neither logical reason nor historical evidence that
political or psychological collapse inevitably follows economic hard-
ship, no matter how great the hardship.2 Nonetheless, I intend to ignore
this essentially noneconomic issue and focus on the link between the
international imposition of economic sanctions and the ensuing loss of
economic welfare. The second problem lies in the words, &dquo;target
country.&dquo; This simple concept is adequate only if we deal with a homo-
genous population, with each member identically affected by sanc-
tions, which reaches policy decisions by consensus. In any application of
sanctions to South Africa, it must be remembered that the target is white
South Africans’ welfare; indeed, the true objective presumably would be
to reduce the sum of all white South Africans’ welfares, individually
weighted by their importance in the political process.
I begin with a &dquo;basic theory&dquo; of sanctions. For ease of exposition, this
theory is aggregative, static, and neo-classical.3 After this &dquo;basic theory&dquo;
is developed, five alternative theories of how sanctions are supposed to
work will be briefly examined. To understand the &dquo;basic theory,&dquo; it is
sufficient to consider a hypothetical target country that produces and
2. Powerful recent evidence comes from North Vietnam: "the argument that the
bombing would affect the will of Hanoi’s leadership is generally based on three supposi-
tions. First, the bombing would so reduce North Vietnam’s capability to successfully
prosecute the war that Hanoi would either sue for peace or substantially reduce the level of
warfare. Second, the leadership would decide that the level of destruction visited upon the
North Vietnamese economy was greater than the gain from supporting the revolution in
the South Or third, that the morale of the North Vietnamese population would so de-
tenonate that the leadership would be forced to seek relief from the bombing through
negotiations or reduced support for the forces in the South.
Examination of the results of the bombing indicates that none of these suppositions
have been borne out in practice." (Biles, 1972: 15).
One seeks in vain for evidence from Rhodesia, where real GDP grew at nearly 7% per
annum during 1965-1974. Only in an opportunity-cost sense could it be said that there was
hardship. In any case, it was not sanctions that humbled the white government of Rho-
desia (see Porter, 1978a).
3. However, the empirical work in Sections IV and V is based on a model that is dis-
aggregated (i e , the economy contains eight sectors), and fixed-coefficient (i.e., much of
the substitutability of neo-classical functions will be discarded in order to make the em-
pirical work feasible) The empirical work there continues to be static, which means that
it will be concerned only with the short-run implications of sanctions.
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consumes two commodities and initially trades freely at exogenously
determined prices. For analytical simplicity, the possibility that factors
of production also move is ignored. But we must remember that, for
South Africa, labor and capital movements have always been im-
portant. Figure 1 displays the standard trade model, with the (concave)
production possibility curve, the (convex) community indifference
curve, and the optimizing trade possibility line, tangent to both curves.
For maximum welfare (Wo), the country produces xo and yo, exports
good x and imports good y, and consumes x, and yi. In Figure 2, a
dashed community indifference curve (WI) is added which shows the
highest welfare the country can attain if it is denied access to inter-
national trade; it produces and consumes X2 and Y2; its welfare, Wi in-
stead of Wo, is clearly reduced.
Examination of Figure 2 indicates that the magnitude of this relative
loss of real income will be greater (1) the less flat (i.e., more concave) is
the production possibility curve, (2) the less flat (i.e., more convex) the
community indifference curve, or (3) the greater the initial trade.
In other words, sanctions which preclude trade will be more effective
(1) the more inflexible the target country’s production structure, (2)
the more inflexible its consumption preferences, or (3) the greater its
initial dependence on imports and exports. This last condition is the
only one that is usually explicitly mentioned in the sanctions literature
(see, for example, Maizels, 1964: 120-121). In light of these three con-
ditions, it is easy to see why great things might be expected by the world
community of sanctions against South Africa. Imports equal roughly
one-fourth of South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP); its
exports are heavily dependent on a few minerals; and it might still be
viewed as lacking the economic maturity that lends flexibility to a pro-
ductive structure.
So far this basic theory has treated the degree of flexibility and de-
pendence of the target country as essentially exogenous data. For the
sanctioning countries, of course, this is correct; but an expectant target
country can do much to increase its flexibility and reduce its dependence
on imports (Arad and Hillman, 1978). One can readily envisage in-
corporation of duopoly-like threats and reactions into the model, but no
formal extension is necessary to see its principal lesson: that the longer
the world debates the imposition of sanctions, the smaller may be their
effect when finally imposed. In South Africa’s case, preparation for
sanctions has meant not so much a reduction in dependence or an
increase in flexibility as a build-up of stockpiles of critical imports,
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Figure 1
particularly oil. Recent estimates of the size of South Africa’s oil in-
ventory suggest one and a half to two years (Raiford, 1978: 57; Bailey
and Rivers, 1978; 58).
The basic theory above is also developed on the assumption that
sanctions are universal-that is, they completely prevent all imports
into the country. If only some countries impose sanctions, the impact
depends critically on the extent to which the target country can acquire
the same imports from other sources. (The potential for sanctions
imposed by all countries but only on certain kinds of imports is dis-
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Figure 2
cussed later.) Again, a formal model-incorporating limits to the target
country’s exports and imports-is not needed to see the principal qual-
itative result: partial sanctions achieve partial results.
While the foregoing analysis and conclusions seem straightforward,
there are alternative theories about the connection between sanctions
and welfare:
(1) Sanctions which apply only to certain exports and/or imports
may be effective if there are inflexibilities in particular areas of con-
sumption or (more plausibly) production in the target economy. In the
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South African context, partial sanctions might be effective if they can
(a) somehow &dquo;clog&dquo; fiscally the South African economy with inexport-
able minerals or (b) damage South African production through the
scarcity of critical raw materials (particularly petroleum). The clogging
possibility can be seen in Figure 2; if the policy-makers of the target
country cannot (or dare not) force a reduction in export-good produc-
tion (from Xo to X2), the final welfare position is reduced even below W,
(as production and consumption of the import good is reduced below
Y2 to yo). Although this happened to some extent in Rhodesia (with
tobacco), it seems less likely to arise in South Africa (with gold and
diamonds) and will be ignored hereafter. The possibility of bottlenecks
due to scarcity of particular imports is more relevant and could be
examined through a sufficiently disaggregated model. Unfortunately,
our later simulations deal with eight sectors, which is hardly disaggre-
gated enough.
(2) Sanctions may cause a reduced growth rate. Even if the static real
income losses are not large, they represent losses at the critical margin
and increasingly will show up as inefficiency in the use of labor and
capital, reduced saving (and investment) rates, and hence a lower rate of
growth of output. By focusing on growth, and hence the long run, this
alternative suggests the need for patience and persistence in the use of
sanctions. It also assumes that foregone growth, even without an actual
decline in living standards, will weaken the target country’s resolve. This
theory conflicts with the basic theory more directly than it at first seems.
Static analysis assumes that the elasticity of substitution in both pro-
duction and consumption increases, the longer the period considered.
Thus, for the basic theory, sanctions must work quickly, for they are
increasingly averted by long-run adjustment. The empirical work in
Sections IV and V is based on a simple model that does not consider
saving, capacity growth, or time, and therefore does not examine this
alternative to the basic theory, but it is discussed in the next section.
(3) According to a more Keynesian view of sanctions, one should
focus on the lost exports which represent a decline in aggregate demand
and, after the operation of the multiplier, result in recession and un-
employment (presumably of whites as well as blacks). This is a very
different approach to sanctions. It is entirely demand-focused, whereas
the basic theory is entirely supply-focused. Accordingly, the policy
implications also differ. In neither view is it necesasry to impose sanc-
tions on both sides of the export-import trade. In the basic theory, the
critical sanctions are against imports-in terms of Figure 2, if the
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country continues to export but is unable to import, its consumption
bundle will be somewhere within the production possibility curve, and
its welfare level therefore even lower than WI-in the Keynesian model,
the critical sanctions are against exports, although sanctions against
imports will also have some effect to the extent that they lower the
marginal propensity to import, and thus raise the multiplier. The diffi-
culty with this Keynesian, aggregate-demand model is that it must be
assumed that the target country is unable either to recognize the source
of its reduced real income or to undertake the expansionary macro-
economic policies necessary to offset the losses in export demand. Both
of these assumptions are dubious in general, and in the South African
context especially unwarranted-the imposition of international eco-
nomic sanctions will surely be accompanied by increasing internal and
external pressures that will warrant increased defense expenditure. Any
aggregate-demand impact of economic sanctions is hereafter ignored.
(4) According to a dualistic view of the South African economy,
there is an &dquo;unlimited&dquo; supply of black labor available to the modern
white-directed industrial, mining, and agricultural sectors at a low, con-
stant, and essentially irreducible wage. Under this assumption, little of
the damage imposed by sanctions can be shifted to blacks; and hence
even a quite small impact on aggregate variables may be critical to the
wages, profits, employment, consumption, and welfare of the relatively
small white ruling community (see Porter, 1978 for the South African
case). In fact, however, black laborers employed in the cities of South
Africa earn wages well above the rural standard of living. Their first and
greater unemployment as a result of sanctions would mean that blacks
as well as (or instead of) whites suffered from sanctions.
(5) Finally, there is a view of sanctions that sees their effects as
perverse (from the position of the countries imposing the sanctions).
This theory begins with the belief that economic development requires a
poor country to free itself of dependence on the export of primary
products; hence the appropriate development policies include govern-
ment encouragement of agricultural self-sufficiency and increased
protection of industrial production. Thus, economic sanctions may
force the target country to adopt the very policies needed for its own
development. Of course, for best results (from the target country’s view-
point) the sanctions must be partial, effective enough to induce in-
dustrialization but not so effective as to make it impossible. Very few
writers take this extreme position on the working of economic sanctions
(e.g., Hoogevelt and Child, 1973), and in any case the argument is much
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less appropriate for South Africa than it might have been for Rhodesia
since the South African economy has already undergone such extensive
industrialization and import substitution. This view is ignored in the
empirical effort of Sections IV and V.
III. THE DEPENDENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA
&dquo;Dependence&dquo; has been variously defined and much debated in the
literature on economic development. Here, I want to use the word in the
sense suggested by the preceding theoretical discussion, namely, the
extent to which South Africa is vulnerable as a target for international
economic sanctions.
This vulnerability is usually thought to be primarily in the target
country’s exports, partly because the very word &dquo;boycott&dquo; has come to
mean a concerted refusal to buy rather than to sell, and partly because
whatever success was achieved by the sanctions applied against Rhodesia4
occurred largely through the refusal of the world markets to accept
Rhodesian tobacco. The impact of such a reduction in exports follows
from the concurrent loss of earnings of foreign exchange and hence the
ability to purchase essential or highly desired imported goods.
In South Africa’s case, it may be difficult to muster a sufficient world
consensus in practice against the purchase of exports as a means of
denying South Africa foreign exchange. First of all, nearly half of South
Africa’s exports are the most eminently acceptable commodity of all:
gold. Gold exports were R 2,565.3 million in 1974 out of an export total
of R 5,571.3 million (excluding re-exports). (The South African rand
[R] was worth US $1.40 before 1975 and US $1.15 after.) And one half
of the remaining exports are readily marketable mineral outputs, raw or
slightly processed, which are sufficiently homogeneous to enter world
markets with few distinguishable South African markings.5 It will not be
easy for the world to reduce significantly South Africa’s foreign ex-
change availability. An alternative would be world sanctions aimed
4. For a discussion and explanation of the notable lack of success of the Rhodesian
sanctions, during 1965-1975, see Porter, 1978a. But Rhodesian exports were reduced, in
1968, to an annual rate 39% below their 1965 annual rate. (They rose again thereafter.)
5. These are (in 1974): crude materials excluding fuels (SITC 2), R 594.2 million;
nonmetallic mineral manufactures (SITC 66), R 374.3 million; iron and steel (SITC 67),
R 217.2 million; and nonferrous metals (SITC 68), R 290.9 million. The total is R 1,476.6
million, 49% of total nongold exports.
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directly at restricting South African imports. But this also may be diffi-
cult to achieve in practice as long as South Africa has the foreign ex-
change to pay for imports.
Whether imports are cut off directly or indirectly (through a reduc-
tion in South Africa’s ability to export and hence its ability to pay for
imports), the critical question remains: what damage would the result-
ing import reductions impose on the South African economy? If one
measures dependence on imports as the ratio of imports to output
(GDP), South Africa is an average country in this respect, with imports
amounting to about one-fifth of GDP.6 Of course, that fraction by itself
divulges little because it says nothing of how easily South Africa can
dispense with (previously) imported goods entirely or can introduce
their production domestically. For this, one must turn to the composi-
tion of imports. South African trade data are elaborately reported by
both SITC and ISIC (i.e., by source sector), but they are most inter-
estingly viewed by use, as in Table 1.
The industrialization of South Africa over the last half century has
not been atypical. As white incomes rose, consumer goods became
manufactured domestically, and the intermediate inputs needed also
became increasingly produced domestically. Accordingly, the impor-
tance of consumer goods and intermediate inputs declined in total
imports. Simultaneously, low tariffs on capital equipment, maintained
to encourage investment and reduce manufacturing costs, insured that
domestic capital goods production lagged, and capital equipment be-
came an ever larger portion of total imports (Zarenda, 1977). Indeed,
as import-substitution industrialization proceeded into its later, more
technologically advanced and capital-intensive stages, not only did the
dependence on imports of capital equipment intensify, but the ability to
produce intermediate inputs domestically failed to keep up. Thus, the
decline of intermediate inputs in total imports decelerated.
Though brief and oversimplified (see Houghton, 1976: Chs. 6 and 8
for more details), this account of South African industrialization in-
dicates its point of vulnerability to sanctions. Reduced capacity to
import would not have much direct impact on consumer welfare. Less
than 10% of total consumption is imported, and much of this is &dquo;luxury&dquo;
consumption, easily expendable in a time of crisis. The brunt of sanc-
6. The countries reported in Kindleberger and Herrick, 1977. 284, range from nearly
zero to 76%, with 33 below South Africa and 39 above. The median there of imports/ GDP
is 21%. It should be noted that the Rhodesian ratio was over 30% in 1965.
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TABLE 1
South African Imports, by Use, 1974a
a. Source: Dept. of Statistics, South African Statistics, various years, table entitled
&dquo;Imports by Use and Stage of Processing.&dquo;
b. Includes &dquo;raw (or crude) materials&dquo; and &dquo;processed or manufactured materials&dquo;
other than &dquo;capital equipment.&dquo;
c. I.e., &dquo;articles ready for retail sale or consumers’ use.&dquo;
d. I.e., &dquo;capital equipment.&dquo;
e. Figures in parentheses are percentages of totals.
f. Columns do not sum to total because two minor hard-to-classify categories are
omitted.
tions would be felt in the other two categories of imports, intermediate
inputs and capital goods.
For intermediate inputs, analysis at the highly aggregate level at
which this section deals yields no insight into the potential effect of
sanctions. For that, one must examine the composition of these inputs
and estimate the extent to which they can be replaced by domestic pro-
duction and at what resource cost. A systematic effort to do this is the
chief thrust of the next two sections.
For capital goods, analysis at the macrolevel yields a great deal of
insight. Imports of capital equipment currently comprise more than
one-third of total South African gross domestic fixed investment,7 and
the South African construction sector provides 70% of the remainder.
Although South Africa has for some time recognized (and worried
about) its almost total dependence on capital goods imports, it is still
accurate to say that South Africa imports almost all of its capital equip-
ment-with domestic industry essentially providing only the plant in
7. In 1974, 33.9% (R 2,047 million of R 6,026 million). This percentage has remained
quite stable over the past two decades: in 1964, 34.7% (R 556 million of R 1,605 million);
and in 1957, 32.7% (R 306 million of R 936 million). (Source for gross domestic fixed in-
vestment data I M F , May 1978 ) Put differently, imported capital goods made up 79 0%
of the total equipment content of fixed investment in 1974 (R 2,047 million out of R 2,593
million; source of latter figure: South Africa Reserve Bank, March 1978, p. S-81); these
figures may not be exactly comparable, but they are suggestive.
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which it is housed. Thus, if sanctions were to cut off South Africa from
capital equipment, South Africa’s growth should effectively cease. In-
deed, as time went and depreciation became relevant, the output poten-
tial of South Africa would be reduced unless it could rapidly develop
from a very undeveloped base its own capital goods industries. No
elaborate model is needed to conclude that sanctions against South
Africa could be effective in the sense that South Africa’s growth as a
modern, industrialized economy could be dramatically interrupted.
All studies I have seen agree on this (see, e.g., Marvin, 1964: 240 and
Spandau, 1978: 271). Because this conclusion is so obvious, the model
developed and applied in the next two sections is only concerned with
the short-run impact of sanctions.
Besides trade, there is a second way in which South Africa is de-
pendent on the world economy: for its net inflow of factors of produc-
tion. Consider, first, capital. South Africa was a net debtor in the world
community in 1976, as Table 2 shows, to the tune of nearly fifteen billion
rands, a figure that is roughly half its GDP. Needless to say, few dis-
cussions of sanctions against South Africa fail to consider the &dquo;dis-
engagement&dquo; or &dquo;withdrawal&dquo; of foreign capital.
The process whereby sanctions on international investment damage
the target economy is more subtle than the theory about trade sanctions,
and misconceptions abound. To begin with, the very words &dquo;disengage-
ment&dquo; and &dquo;withdrawal&dquo; invite misinterpretation. There is no possibility
that South Africa would permit the actual physical withdrawal of the
capital equipment which is the counterpart of the foreign net asset
position in South Africa. Should foreigners attempt to unload the
shares, loans, mortgages, etc. that represent claims on South African
output, they would threaten disorder in the financial and foreign ex-
change markets of South Africa, but they would not reduce the econ-
omy’s real capital stock one iota (Harvey, 1975). Of course, the financial
disruption might make it difficult for South Africa to operate this
capital at capacity (Myers et al., 1978). The most that &dquo;disengagement&dquo;
can mean, therefore, is the cessation of new (and replacement) invest-
ment. It might also mean, in the case of multinational corporations,
that the parent would withhold personnel, intermediate inputs, and
technological information from its South African subsidiary. With
respect to personnel, withdrawal would be marginal, as South Africans
now provide almost all the manpower, even at the highest levels, in their
industrial establishment. With respect to inputs, the workings of the
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TABLE 2
Foreign Assets and Liabilities of South Africa, 1976 a,b
a. At end of year.
b. Source: South African Reserve Bank, March 1978, pp. S-64 through S-67.
c. Banks are included under &dquo;government.&dquo;
d. Short-term assets include &dquo;gold reserves&dquo; and &dquo;SDRs.&dquo;
sanctions follow the path already discussed for imports in general; the
amount of damage hinges on the difficulty in South Africa of replacing
the foregone imports from other (domestic or foreign) sources, or of
doing without.
In the end, therefore, withdrawal of international investment is
basically a growth-related threat. Except as a form of import sanction, it
cannot have much short-run impact. Through its investment and tech-
nological components, however, such disengagement has a large
potential impact on South Africa’s rate of growth.
A second misconception about investment sanctions stems from a
fascination with the ratio in South Africa of foreign investment to total
investment; for example, &dquo;during the years 1970 to 1977, average annual
foreign capital inflows amounted to $580 million or 9.4 percent of gross
investments&dquo; (Spandau, 1978: 197). The implication is that a one dollar
reduction in foreign investment will lead to a one dollar reduction in
total investment (or perhaps even a multiplied reduction of US $10.64
[equals $1/.094] in total investment). The implicit macromodel is both
naive theoretically and refuted empirically. In 1977, for example, the net
capital inflow into South Africa fell to minus R 1,096 million from plus
R 1,110 million in 1976, a drop of R 2,206 million. Gross domestic in-
vestment fell from R 8,608 million to R 8,303 million, only 3.5% (South
Africa Reserve Bank, March 1978: S-81). Even lagged relationships are
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unlikely. In the early 1960s, foreign capital flowed out of South Africa
for seven years, and real GDP in South Africa continued to grow at
5-6% per annum throughout the period (Harvey, 1975: 21).
The real impact of any reduction in foreign (net) investment in South
Africa must derive, in the short run, from its impact on the balance of
payments. Inflow of capital permits South Africa to import more, for
given exports, and hence achieve a higher level of welfare (if the addi-
tional imports are consumer goods), output (if they are raw materials),
or growth (if they are capital goods). A reduction in this capital inflow
would force South Africa to reduce its imports-even without trade
sanctions being imposed and as a result the economy would suffer the
same kind of short-run economic damage as with direct import sanc-
tions.
Capital sanctions would, of course, invite retaliation. South Africa
probably would, as Rhodesia did, react to a ban on capital inflows by
banning capital outflows and, more critically, the remission of interest,
dividends, etc. on foreign assets in South Africa. It is instructive to
examine the joint impact on South Africa’s balance of payments of
world investment sanctions and such a South African retaliation. In
Table 3 the South African balance of payments for 1972-1977 is shown.
In parentheses are shown what the figures would have been in each year
if (1) world investment sanctions had cut off all long-term capital move-
ments into and out of South Africa, (2) South Africa had prevented all
investment income, nontrade-related service payments, and transfers
from moving into or out of South Africa and (3) trade had (somehow)
not been affected by either of these event. It can be seen in Table 3 that
the net effect of these changes would have worsened South Africa’s
&dquo;basic balance&dquo; in only three of the last six years. Indeed, if South Africa
had altered its imports each year so as to have maintained the same basic
balance with investment sanctions as it would have had without, its total
imports for the six-year period would not even have contracted.
In sum, investment sanctions show much less potential than trade
sanctions for causing a reduction in South African imports. In the
model of the next two sections, we will make different assumptions
about what happens to South African foreign capital flows (i.e., to the
balance of trade) under sanctions; as might be anticipated from the
8. Travel is also assumed unaffected. The reason for excluding trade effects is not
(obviously) to write a realistic scenano but rather to isolate the potential balance-of-
payments impact of investment sanctions alone. In reality, of course, many of the capital


























































above discussion, the results in the short run, which is all the model will
consider, are not very sensitive to this choice of assumption.
A second factor of production also migrates, in a net sense, into
South Africa: labor. The &dquo;modern&dquo; part of the South African economy
receives (net) both white and black labor through migration. Inter-
national sanctions could attempt to reduce either or both of these flows.
The magnitudes are not trivial. South Africa’s white population cur-
rently has a natural rate of increase (i.e., birth rate minus death rate) of
1.2%. Net immigration of whites has, over the past decade, been around
30,000 per annum, which has raised the growth rate of the white popu-
lation by about one percentage point. White immigration supports the
white polity and economy in a number of well-known ways. The avail-
ability of black labor from neighboring countries helps to ensure an
unlimited supply of low-opportunity-cost labor (see Porter, 1978; this
flow has recently been much reduced, supposedly for political reasons).
However, since sanctions along these lines are rarely discussed, I shall
ignore them in the work of the next two sections.
In summary, there are two basic kinds of sanctions, trade sanctions
and capital sanctions, and two general kinds of impact, in the short run
and on growth. South Africa’s extreme dependence on imported capital
goods makes it very probable that its growth would be critically affected
by a reduction in its ability to import. And investment sanctions which
reduced its access to new technology would also hurt its growth poten-
tial. The impact of sanctions in the short run, however, is much less
clear. Sanctions which cut olf capital inflows into South Africa would
almost surely be met by retaliatory bans on outflows, and the overall
short-run effect on imports and output would probably be small.
Sanctions which directly reduced imports would certainly directly
affect South Africa’s output, but by how much is an empirical issue
which hinges essentially on the flexibility and adaptability of the South
African industrial structure. The model developed and exercised in the
next two sections is intended to provide some insight into this flexibility,
and hence some idea about how much South African output would be
reduced by an externally imposed reduction in its imports.
IV. A MODEL TO ESTIMATE
THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS
In this section, a model is developed to estimate the short-run effects
on the South African economy of various trade and investment sanc-
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tions that might be imposed. The model is static, in the sense that the
initial capital stock is taken as given throughout, in total and by sector,
so that the estimated effects of sanctions can be thought of as those
occurring in the short run-a period long enough that initial stockpiles
become irrelevant but short enough that compensatory growth and
movements (and depreciation) of capital are not yet critical. The model
is consistent in the sense that the total supplies from all sources of each
output and input must be adequate to provide the total demands for all
uses. And the model relies on input-output relationships-for the out-
put of each of the eight sectors considered, there are needs for inputs of
seven kinds of labor, intermediate-good imports, intermediate goods
from each of the eight domestic sectors, and plant capacity.
Two ingredients of the model which critically underlie the estimates
of the impact of sanctions (calculated in the next section) require dis-
cussion before turning to the details of the model. First, it is assumed
that the South Africans react optimally to sanctions; that is, they
maximize a social objective function, subject to the constraints imposed
upon them by sanctions. This means that the model specifically ignores
those theories of sanctions that work through reduced aggregate de-
mand or target-country policy failure or inertia. In this sense, therefore,
the resulting estimates are of the minimum impact of sanctions. South
African policy ineptness, confusion, or inadequacy could immeasurably
compound this impact.
And second, it is assumed that there is some substitutability in South
African production functions. If there were none, then, except as un-
necessary final-demand imports could be curtailed, any reduction in
imports would mean reductions in intermediate-good imports; this, in
turn, would cause a proportionate reduction in the output of the sector
for which they were destined and unemployment of a proportionate
amount of labor and capital there. Such an assumption would be ex-
treme, as is shown by both South Africa’s specific imports at the detailed
microeconomic level and the evidence from Rhodesia for the late 1960s.9
But the other extreme, to assume that South African labor and capital
could readily provide a replacement for any import, is equally un-
tenable. We shall assume that, even in the short run before new capital
can be installed, South African factors can replace imports to some
9. Rhodesia’s real GDP fell only in 1966, by 4.4%, while its imports fell by 29.4%.
Real GDP began to rise again in 1967, even though imports did not regain their 1965 level
until 1971 (Porter, 1978a).
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extent but at high cost. That is a broad outline of the ingredients of the
model. The rest of this section explains the model in greater detail, but
still entirely in words, if
The discussion below is first of the constraints on South Africa’s eco-
nomic activity, and then of the objective function of South African
policy-makers. There are three kinds of constraints: (1) technological
constraints, (2) external constraints imposed through international
sanctions on imports into South Africa, and (3) constraints which South
Africans choose to impose upon themselves. This third group of con-
straints perhaps needs a few words of general explanation, as it appears
inconsistent to try to maximize an objective function and simulta-
neously to restrict one’s actions in that effort. Some of these constraints
are historically, culturally, or behaviorally sufficiently entrenched as to
be either unrecognizable to South African policy-makers as potential
policy tools or not susceptible to change even under conditions of crisis.
Others of these constraints are really part of the objective function, but
the extremely nonlinear way in which they enter makes it more con-
venient to consider them as policy constraints.
The technological constraints involve the relationship between the
various inputs and each sector’s output. For the most part, it is assumed
that there is no substitutability between inputs, hence that there is a
certain amount of each input required per unit of each sector’s output.
Thus, for each of the seven occupations and eight sectors, there are
labor-output coefficients (56); there are also interindustry intermediate-
good input-output coefficients (64, though many are zero); there are
intermediate-good import-output coefficients (8); and there are capital-
output coefficients (since capital is unchanging and sector-specific in the
short run, these coefficients enter simply through a maximum output
level for each sector). Introducing substitutability-with less than an
infinite elasticity of substitution-is difficult in a linear programming
model, but it is essential for realism that there be some. Thus, one kind
of substitution between inputs is permitted in the model, that labor can
partially replace intermediate-good imports. In terms of Figure 3, if
output under sanctions were to require labor and imports in the same
ratios as before sanctions, the unit-output isoquant would be the solid
right-angled line, a/3y. In the model we shall assume instead that such
imports can be economized if sufficient new labor is employed; hence a
10. The equations of the full model are described in Appendix A; the data base and the
parameter estimates are shown in Appendix B; and the precise nature of the substitut-
ability between labor and imports is developed in Appendix C. (See footnote 1.)
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Figure 3
range, ~38, in which substitution can occur. The unit isoquant employed
in the model is therefore the partly solid and partly dashed line, a/366.
Labor in the model is disaggregated into occupations (seven) and
races (two) as well as sectors (eight). It would be clearly unrealistic to
assume that, even in the short run, there is a fixed labor-output co-
efficient for each kind of labor and for each race. The very system of
South African discrimination suggests the extent to which substitution
is possible. Within any broad occupational category such as we are using
-e.g., production or sales worker-blacks there will be trained to do
only the lower-rung jobs and hence would be able to substitute for the
better educated, better trained, higher-rung whites to only a limited
599
extent, namely around the ladder rungs at which the races are divided.
Thus, within any occupation, whites and nonwhites are assumed per-
fectly substitutable as long as the ratio between the two races remains
within a certain percentage of the presanctions ratio; beyond that per-
centage no further substitution is possible. Because the occupational
groups are so broad, it seems reasonable to assume that there is no
substitutability in the short run between labor of different occupations.
Finally, constraints were also included concerning the total number of
workers in the more skilled occupations; this is intended to reflect the
fact that, in the short run, the amount of labor upgrading and training
that can be completed is quite limited.
The possible external constraints imposed on South Africa through
international sanctions have been extensively discussed in the previous
two sections. Here it need only be recalled that their common denom-
inator-especially in the context of this model-is the withholding of
crucial imports. The model treats this not as a direct curtailment of im-
ports but rather as a reduction in exports and/ or foreign capital flows,
which in turn means a reduction in foreign exchange earnings by South
Africa and in its ability to purchase imports. In the next section, the
extent to which exports and the balance of trade are affected by sanc-
tions will be varied among simulations, but the effect is always to reduce
imports, and thus the ability of the South African economy to produce
output. The sanctions this model considers are always reductions in
imports, but South Africa is always left free to determine the composi-
tion of its limited imports. Direct restrictions on the composition of
imports could hurt South African GDP beyond the estimates made
here.
Although it is difficult to forecast how policy-makers will react to a
crisis of a nature and extent not previously observed, there are clearly
constraints on what South African policy can do. We assume relatively
few constraints; if there are more, and they are binding, then the GDP
estimates of this model are biased upward (that is, the harm done by
sanctions would in fact be greater than here estimated). The policy con-
straints in the model are the following:
( I ) The long run must not be sacnficed, thus, the total and sectoral composition of
investment is to be maintained (if possible).
(2) The need for government activity is not reduced because of the crisis; thus, total
government consumption is to be maintained (if possible) and its sectoral com-
position varied only within narrow limits.
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(3) The sectoral composition of pnvate consumption can only be vaned, m the short
run, within narrow limits. (This means, of course, that the implicit community
indifference curve of Figures I and 2 is not a smoothly curved function.)
(4) Full employment of the white labor force is to be achieved (if possible).
(5) White laborers are not to be &dquo;uprooted&dquo; (if possible); thus, the total number of
white workers m each occupation-and-sector is subject to change only within
narrow limits.
The objective of South African policy-makers, once faced with sanc-
tions, is assumed to be simply the maximization of total output, or
GDP. Other objectives were considered-such as the maximization
of total white (wage plus nonwage) income or consumption-but,
given the model and its constraints, this seemingly important change
did not much affect the results of the simulations.
V. ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS
This section, which estimates the impact of sanctions (according to
the model described in the previous section), is divided into four parts.
First, a baseline picture is established of a South African economy that
is prepared for, but not yet actually subject to, sanctions. Second, the
economy is simulated, through the model, as if it were subject to
sanctions which reduced its exports and capital inflows by various
across-the-board percentages. Third, the sensitivity of the results to
changes in parameter values and assumptions is explored. And finally, a
&dquo;greatest impact&dquo; of sanctions is estimated by moving simultaneously
all parameter values and assumptions to their most damaging while
still plausible extremes.
A baseline picture of the South African economy without sanctions
must be drawn in order to estimate the impact of sanctions. Although
the actual official South African statistics of some recent year would
seem to provide an adequate base, there are two problems. First, the
data needs of the model are sufficiently great that the year 1967 had to
be chosen as the base. (Note that the real GDP rose by about one half
between 1967 and 1977.) Moreover, since data from different official
sources had to be molded into one internally consistent set, the base
year &dquo;1967&dquo; that emerged is not exactly the same, in most of its statistical
components, as any official South African &dquo;1967.&dquo;
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The second difficulty with using actual data as a basis for comparison
is that South Africa has never urgently anticipated the imposition of
sanctions. Thus, the proper comparison, for estimates of the impact of
sanctions, is between South Africa under sanctions and a South Africa
prepared for, but not actually suffering from, sanctions. The very pre-
paration process, which would presumably achieve a fuller utilization of
existing supplies of capital and labor, might itself raise South Africa’s
GDP. Accordingly, the base year itself requires simulation. This picture
of South Africa, before sanctions but prepared for sanctions, is created
by running the optimizing model with exports and imports constrained
to be no greater than their actual 1967 levels.
The &dquo;actual&dquo; data of 1967, and the hypothetical model-generated
1967 data of a South Africa prepared for sanctions are compared in
Table 4. ~ ~ The model indicates that two notable changes occur in this
process of becoming prepared. First, exports and imports are reduced
about 6%. This seems curious in that sanctions have not yet been im-
posed, but what it actually reflects is a large reduction in luxury con-
sumption imports and a simultaneous reduction in the need to export
to pay for them-and hence a release of export-labor for production in
crucial domestic activities. And second, GDP is expanded by 3%, chiefly
by the use of more nonwhite labor. The figures in the &dquo;prepared&dquo; column
of Table 4 are the base-year data to which all subsequent simulations
are compared.
There is an infinite variety of trade sanctions that could be applied
to South Africa-different combinations of sanctioning countries, dif-
ferent combinations of prohibited exports (to South Africa), and differ-
ent degrees of success in applying those sanctions. The model is too
aggregated (and too expensive) to explore this variety fully. Here, we
will look primarily at across-the-board sanctions, meaning that the
maximum value of each sector’s exports and the net capital flow (i.e., the
trade balance) is reduced, through sanctions, by some percentage. The
simulations consider these cuts in 10% jumps, from 10% through 60%.
Such across-the-board, but less than 100%, sanctions can be interpreted
as a less than complete world involvement in the sanctions and/ or a less
11. The fact that the two differ indicates either the extent to which the model is in-
accurate or that the economic objectives of South Africa, when not sanctioned, involve
other variables than GDP. I am assuming it is largely the latter. Indeed, the larger GDP
with "preparedness" may well require policy actions that are dysfunctional for the econ-
omy under normal circumstances (a point suggested in correspondence by Desaix Myers).
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TABLE 4
The Actual and Prepared South African Economy, 1967
a. See text tor description ot this term.
b. Prepared minus actual, divided by actual.
c. Constrained to zero.
d. Thousands of workers.
than complete success at implementing universal sanctions. The simula-
tions cease at 60% across-the-board reductions simply because I felt
that by then, the basic structure of the South African economy would
surely have become so changed that the model could no longer ade-
quately describe it.
The simulated results of these across-the-board percentage cuts are
shown in Figure 4. The data for the zero &dquo;cut&dquo; represent the prepared but
not yet sanctioned economy described earlier. 10% and 20% reductions
have relatively small impacts on GDP and its components. GDP de-
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Figure 4
clines trom R 8,400 million to R 8,036 million and R 7,81 1 million, re-
spectively. The implied elasticity of GDP with respect to sanctions is
less than one-half-that is, for small reductions, an x% across-the-board
cut in exports and imports causes a less than Y2X% cut in GDP.
The impact increases noticeably once 30% cuts are considered. GDP
drops to R 6,575 million, 21.7Q/o below the prepared but not yet sanc-
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tioned level of R 8,400 million. The cause of this increased impact is not
hard to find. Initially, imports of finished consumption goods comprise
17.8% of total imports. When sanctions are applied, luxury consump-
tion imports are foregone (by South Africa) first. These provide a
cushion of expendable imports that prevent &dquo;light&dquo; sanctions from
having much impact on real output. But, by the time 30% cuts are
reached, consumption-good imports have fallen to only 8.5% of total
imports, and the remaining consumption goods are not so readily
surrendered. At somewhere between 20% and 30% effectiveness, sanc-
tions begin to &dquo;bite.&dquo;
At 40% across-the-board sanctions, there is no feasible solution to
the model. By then, sanctions have become sufficiently constricting to
the South African economy that all the technological, behavioral and
policy constraints of the model cannot be simultaneously satisfied. The
South African reaction must be to relax some of the policy constraints.
Specifically, I assume that in this circumstance: (1) investment can no
longer be held at its presanctions level but is only required to be at its
presanctions ratio to consumption; (2) ditto for government expendi-
tures ; and (3) the &dquo;uprooting&dquo; of white laborers (i.e., their transfer to
other occupations and / or sectors) will be permitted to whatever extent
necessary.12 This less exacting set of policy constraints permits the
South Africans to find a feasible solution under sanctions-imposed
export cuts of 40% or more.
With the less exacting set of policy constraints, a 30% across-the-
board cut in all exports and the trade balance reduces GDP to R 7,002
million. (This is shown, in Figure 4, as the higher of the set of points
above 30%.) The implied elasticity of GDP with respect to sanctions
remains less than one-half. But the achievement of this feasible solution
is not without cost. Investment drops to R 2,082 million, only 86% of
its presanctions level. Similarly, government expenditures are reduced
to R 820 million, also (perforce) 86% of their presanctions level. There
is, moreover, some &dquo;uprooting&dquo; of white labor, particularly in two
sectors (and in one of which, mining, white labor has historically proven
the most troublesome in South Africa). In the process of achieving the
feasible solution at 30% export cuts, there are 18 thousand white
workers laid off in mining, a reduction of 31.0%, and 19 thousand white
workers withdrawn from the trade sector, a reduction of 15.8%. Partic-
12. Subject still, of course, to a technological constraint on the rate at which new labor
can be trained in the skilled occupations. The white full employment constraint is also
relaxed, but white employment is then included in the objective function.
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ularly in mining, this may represent a politically intolerable shift in the
structure of white employment.
Once the adjustment is made to the less exacting set of policy con-
straints, further across-the-board reductions in exports and the trade
balance as a result of sanctions cause quantitatively ever more severe,
but qualitatively similar, output reductions. As 40%, 50%, and 60%
sanctions are simulated, South Africa’s GDP drops to 74.5%, 62.3%
and 50.3%, respectively, of its presanctions (but prepared) level. Clearly,
sanctions at these levels can cause significant damage to South African
GDP. The damage is not only in the loss of output. With 60% sanctions,
10.3% of the white labor force becomes unemployed (and nonwhite
employment has fallen from 5,510 thousand in the presanctions
situation to 4,530 thousand, i.e., by 17.8%). And the uprooting of whites
in certain sectors has reached immense proportions; for example, 37.4%
of the white construction workers and 30.6% of the white manufactur-
ing workers must be laid off (or reallocated to other sectors).
Two other basic variations of sanctions were examined. First, we
have so far estimated the impact of sanctions which had &dquo;across-the-
board&dquo; effects on exports-that is, which reduced the exports of all
sectors by the same percentage; but South Africa’s mining sector ex-
ports appear much less vulnerable to sanctions than are its other ex-
ports. Let us consider the extreme case where sanctions are completely
effective against the exports of all sectors other than mining but are
completely ineffective against the exports of the mining sector. This
means a 100% reduction in the nonmining 55% of South Africa’s total
exports, 13 and the results of this simulation of unbalanced sanctions can
be meaningfully compared to across-the-board sanctions which achieve
50% or 60% reductions in each sector’s exports under the less exacting
set of policy constraints. In fact, the aggregate statistics of the mining-
exports-only simulation compare quite closely to the 50% across-the-
board sanctions, as Table 5 shows. GDP and consumption are only
slightiy lower. And white full employment continues to be achieved in
the mining-exports-only situation, as it had in the 50% but not in the
60% across-the-board case. The difference between the two lies, as one
might guess, in the mining sector. In the mining-exports-only simula-
tion, value added and employment in mining are 80.4% and 225.0%
higher, respectively, than in the 50% across-the-board simulation. In the
13. It is also assumed in this run that trade is balanced, i.e., that sanctions effectively
stop all capital flows that might permit trade imbalance.
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TABLE 5
Comparison of Across-the-Board and Mining-Exports-Only Sanctions
a. Production workers only.
50% across-the-board case, nearly half the white (and nonwhite) mining
workers must be laid off; while in the mining-exports-only case, the
white (and nonwhite) mining work force must be almost doubled from
its presanctions level.
The second variation examines the impact, ceteris paribus, of sanc-
tions that affect the net capital flow differently from the trade flow. In
the across-the-board simulations, each sector’s exports and the balance
of trade were all varied by the same percentage. Now, we consider a
situation in which each sector’s exports decline by some percentage but
the balance of trade does not change. Since the balance of trade was
positive in the base year, this is equivalent to assuming that net capital
movements into South Africa were reduced by a larger percentage than
were exports, thus that imports must also be reduced by a larger per-
centage. In the simulation actually undertaken, exports were reduced,
across-the-board, by 30% and the balance of trade kept at its initial level.
This meant that imports had to be reduced by (at least) 31.31 %. In order
to see the difference between the effect of import cuts caused by trade
sanctions and those caused by capital flow sanctions, we will compare
these results with an across-the-board export and trade surplus reduc-
tion of exactly 31.31 %. Imports are reduced identically in the two cases,
but the export total is reduced 30% in one case and 31.31% in the other
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with the same export sector composition. The difference, as one would
hypothesize from the discussion in Section III, is slight; GDP differs by
only 0.3% between the two cases.
Before conducting sensitivity tests, we should notice exactly where in
the South African economy the critical pressure of sanctions is felt-
or more precisely, in the terms of the linear programming model and its
optimization, which of the constraints are most binding (i.e., display the
highest shadow prices) at the optimal solution. Rather than report on
all the simulations, I will examine two in detail, the 30% and the 60%
across-the-board export and trade balance reductions, both under the
less exacting set of policy constraints.
At 30% sanctions, many of the foreign trade, import substitution and
labor constraints are already seriously binding. If sanctions could be
evaded to the extent that R 1,000 of additional exports could be made,
with R 1,000 of additional imports being thereby acquired, the South
Africans could raise their GDP by from R 3,419 to R 3,987, depending
upon which sector did the exporting. If R 1,000 of additional capital
inflow could be induced, South Africa could add R 3,135 to its GDP.
Thus, on the margin (of 30% effective sanctions), each R 1,000 cut in
South Africa’s exports or capital inflow imposes a loss of output of
R 3,000-4,000. Given the costliness of the export losses, the South
African economy turns to intensive efforts at import substitution. But
there are limits to this process in the short run, and these limits are
reached in two sectors, manufacturing and electricity. Furthermore, the
ability to reduce final goods imports, as a percentage of total deliveries,
is exhausted for both private and public consumption. The limits of
import substitution are not reached in the other sectors because of a
scarcity of skilled white labor: an additional white laborer would permit
sufficient new hiring of nonwhites, labor reallocation and extra import
substitution to be worth R 1,549 in added GDP. ~4 Thus, at 30% effective
sanctions, any sanctions-induced net white emigration would add
further to the economic damage.
At 60% sanctions, several more constraints have become binding. A
marginal gain of R 1,000 of exports would mean a GDP gain of from
R 4,871 to R 5,656, depending on the sector from which the export is
made; and a marginal R 1,000 of capital inflow would be worth R 4,503
in GDP. At 60% sanctions, the limits to import substitution have been
reached in almost every sector except construction. Scarcity of white
14. While this figure seems low, compared to white wage rates, it must be remembered
that this marginal white is employed in costly import substitution.
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labor no longer provides any constraint; to the contrary, white un-
employment has become serious, alleviated only by downgrading whites
to lower-rung jobs normally done by nonwhites.
Sensitivity tests were performed on the model by moving, individ-
ually and in combinations up and down by 40% of their basic values,
many of the parameters of the model, especially those whose values
were based more on intuition than evidence. In none of these tests was
the solution value of GDP moved by as much as one percent, except
when the parameters representing the maximum limits to import sub-
stitution by sector were altered. Let us look at the solution when these
limits are all contracted by 40%. With sanctions that effect across-the-
board 40% cuts in exports and the trade balance and with the basic
parameter values, South African GDP would be cut from R 8,400
million (i.e., the presanctions but prepared level) to R 6,260 million-
that is, by 25.5%. If the simulation reducing the parameters limiting the
scope for import substitution by 40%, the GDP drops still further, to
R 5,730 million, i.e., by another 6.3 percentage points.
In a way, the sensitivity tests tell us what we could well have guessed;
namely, that one’s estimate of the short-run impact of sanctions on
South Africa depends importantly on the estimate of the limits to short-
run South African import substitution. But there is a more interesting
interpretation of these results. The estimates of the impact of sanctions
are not so sensitive as we might have expected to the estimates of the
limits to import substitution. In each of the sectors, a careful, plausible
guess was made as to these limits. Now these limits are arbitrarily cut by
40% of that guess. And the resulting estimates of the impact of 40%
effective sanctions changed by only a few percentage points-i.e. from
a 25.5% cut in GDP (from the presanctions, prepared level) to a 31.8%
cut, 15 In short, the sensitivity tests greatly raise my confidence that the
estimates produced by the model are in the right &dquo;ball park&dquo; and are not
highly sensitive to the largely intuited ingredients.
One final sensitivity test was performed, whereby all the arbitrary
parameters were simultaneously moved to values 40% from their basic
values in the direction which increased the damage to South African
output resulting from sanctions. Specifically, this &dquo;greatest impact&dquo;
15. In other words, the estimates of impact moved by 25% (31.8 minus 25.5, divided by
25.5) in response to a 40% change in the critical set of parameters.
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simulation with the less exacting set of policy constraints assumed the
following:
(1) The South African objective function places heavy weight on white employment,
to the point where R 2,000 of output (GDP) will be given up in order to employ one
more white worker.
(2) Sanctions cut all exports and the trade balance to zero, except for mining exports,
which continue undiminished. (Thus, maximum total exports are reduced by
54.8% and imports must be reduced by at least 52.8%.)
(3) Import substitution is made still more costly, and its limit reduced by 40%, in all
sectors.
(4) The initial excess capacity in each sector is reduced by 40%.
(5) The maximum number of new members that can be trained for the skilled occupa-
tions in the short run is lowered by 40%.
(6) The extent to which blacks and whites are substitutable for each other, in any given
occupation and sector, is narrowed by 40%.
(7) The degree of flexibility m the sectoral composition of public and pnvate con-
sumption is reduced by 40%.
This &dquo;greatest impact&dquo; simulation should be compared to the &dquo;mining
exports only&dquo; simulation (see Table 5) since both incorporate the same
export assumption. Worsening all the arbitrary parameters at once
lowers the estimated GDP from R 5,130 million to R 4,591 million, an
additional 6.4% (of the prepared but not yet sanctioned level of R 8,400
million). Thus, the output estimates are not too sensitive to this ex-
tensive parameter variation.l6 Employment estimates, however, tell a
different story. Whereas white full employment had been achieved in the
mining-exports-only simulation, this greatest-impact simulation dis-
plays an 11.8% white unemployment rate (and a reduction also in non-
white employment of 14.7%). Thus, the employment estimates gener-
ated by the model, unlike the GDP estimates, are fairly sensitive to
parameter variation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS
Estimates of the impact of sanctions on South Africa depend crit-
ically on the kinds of sanctions one envisages, the extent to which
16. The reduction in the limits to import substitution alone reduced GDP by 6.3%, so
all the other changes make practically no difference.
610
they are imposed and enforced, and whether one thinks of the short run
or the long run.
Although the long-run analysis in this paper is brief, it seems clear
that sanctions could seriously damage South Africa’s growth rates. Cut
off from access to new foreign technology and imported capital goods
(not just the capital flow), South Africa could not continue to grow at
anything like its historical rates of 5.5% over the past quarter century,
4% in the 1970s (growth rates per annum of real GDP), and perhaps not
at all.
The short-run impact of sanctions depends critically on the extent to
which imports into South Africa are reduced. Capital, or investment,
sanctions would probably not much affect such imports-especially
after the expected South African retaliation cut off capital outflow-
and hence in themselves would not much affect South African pro-
duction.
Direct restriction of South Africa’s ability to import could have a
serious impact, in the short as well as in the long run, on South Africa.
How much impact would depend on the effectiveness of the embargo. If
South Africa’s imports were reduced by less than one-fourth, little eco-
nomic damage would be inflicted-each one percentage point cut in
imports would cause about a one half percentage point cut in GDP.
Once imports were reduced by more than one-fourth, the damage would
become more significant. The elasticity of GDP reductions with respect
to import reductions rises to about one and one-fourth, as import
reductions reach one-half. Should imports be cut by more than one-
half, massive unemployment and relocation of white labor (as well as of
nonwhite labor) would have begun to occur.
There are four caveats to be noted before we conclude. First, models
like the one developed and exercised here are inevitably stylized abstrac-
tions of the economy they try to represent. Anyone who has worked
with sectoral optimization models (especially for LDCs) knows that
they may occasionally-and not so occasionally as one would like-
generate nonsense, despite the fact that each ingredient seems a plaus-
ible if simplified representation of reality. The proper defense of the
model developed here is hardly unbounded faith in complex math-
ematical modeling but rather a lack of confidence in the alternative,
the hidden models that underlie gut reactions and broad judgments.
The second caveat follows the first. Even if the model is a sensible
simplified replication of the South African economic structure, that
structure might alter dramatically under the pressure of sanctions. The
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model, with its innately unchanging view of structure, might then fore-
cast quite badly. While such structural change cannot be easily encom-
passed within a model, it must be remembered that it is also difficult to
foresee without a model. This shortcoming is probably not too serious
as long as our concern is with the short run. But conclusions about
South African growth under sanctions require a strong implicit assump-
tion about South Africa’s ability to alter the structure of (i.e., create)
its capital goods industries. To the extent that history provides evidence,
it is that modern economies fare better than we might expect when
struck by calamity (see, e.g., Hirshleifer, 1963). But this recent evidence
includes no observations of economies so dualistic and so internally
divided at the time of crisis as is South Africa today.
The third caveat, clear to the careful reader of Sections IV and V, is
that the model does not remove our uncertainty about the impact of
sanctions. Rather, it serves only to locate its source and circumscribe
it. In the end, the estimates of the parameters of South Africa’s potential
for import replacement are largely guesses. The results are not terribly
sensitive to variations in these guesses, but they nevertheless are de-
pendent upon them.
Finally, one should recognize that the direction of error of the results
is not clear. The model assumes that South Africa maximizes GDP
under sanctions, and it would therefore appear that its actual GDP
under sanctions would be surely lower than the model estimates. But the
model specifies many structural rigidities-for example, in the com-
position of consumption and the mobility of white labor-that may in
fact turn out to be quite flexible in a beleaguered South Africa. Accord-
ingly, it is impossible to be sure whether the estimates (presented in
Section V) are high or low.
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